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RECENT DECISION
RECOVERY ALLOWED FOR PHYSICAL DAMAGES ARISING
FROM SHOCK OF WITNESSING HARM TO THIRD PARTY
Dillon v. Legg
Until the recent decision of the California Supreme Court in Dillon
v. Legg' American courts consistently had denied that liability may be
predicated upon fright or nervous shock induced solely by a plaintiff's
witnessing or learning of negligently caused injury to a third person.2
1. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
2. The law regarding recovery by third party plaintiffs for emotionally induced
injuries is peculiar in its evolution. Originally recovery by any party for negligent
infliction of emotional harm was barred unless he suffered some physicial impact
through the negligent act of the defendant, even though serious physical injuries
resulted from the shock. Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, [1883] 13 A.C. 222. This
"impact rule" was abandoned by the English courts in a case in which recovery was
allowed for a miscarriage sustained as a result of nervous shock induced by fear of the
defendant's negligently controlled horses. Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
The first American court to abandon the impact requirement was the Supreme Court of
Texas, which allowed recovery for a miscarriage induced by nervous shock sustained
while witnessing an intentional beating of two Negroes. Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210,
13 S.W. 59 (1890). Not all American jurisdictions followed the lead of Hill. In 1894,
New York specifically denied recovery for lack of physical impact. Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). This doctrine prevailed in New York until 1961
when the Court of Appeals specifically overruled Mitchell. Batalla v. State, 10 N.Y2d
237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). Although a majority of the states now
have abandoned the impact rule, some have not, including Indiana. Boston v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945) (dictum); Leatherman v. Gateway
Transp. Co., 331 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1964) (dictum) ; Note, Damages-Mental Suffering,
15 IND. L.J. 239 (1940). Pennsylvania has recently reaffirmed the impact requirement.
Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966). Its continued vogue has been most
notable "in jurisdictions with large cities and their attendant problems of ambulance-
chasing attorneys, long delays between the alleged accident and trial, and witnesses
perhaps not unduly impressed by the appeal of veracity." J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF TORTs 52 (1967).
Jurisdictions abandoning the impact rule have instituted in its stead the "zone of
danger" requirement. Simply stated, the zone of danger limitation requires that a
plaintiff who sustains physical harm as a result of fright or nervous shock must be in
such zone of physical peril as to risk harm to his person. Thus, in 1935, in a case where
a mother witnessed from an upstairs window an injury to her child in the street below,
the court refused recovery squarely on the ground that the mother herself was not
threatened with physical injury. Waube v. Warrington, 126 Wis. 613, 258 N.W. 497
(1935). There is also generally a further requirement that the plaintiff's fear be for
himself rather than for another. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d
295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Waube v. Warrington, supra. This
requirement is implicit in some criticism of the zone of danger rule. E.g., the remarks
of Lord Atkin in Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K.B. 141, 157, quoted in text at note
15, infra. However, at least one jurisdiction has held that the impossibility of separating
the fear for self from fear for another makes this factor irrelevant. Bowman v.
Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); cf. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473,
58 So. 927 (1912), which held that evidence as to peril of the plaintiff's children was
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Recovery had been permitted only where such emotional trauma3 was
relevant in determining the effect of the defendant's negligence on the plaintiff. Some
modern courts have allowed recovery in instances causing fear for the plaintiff's
personal welfare and fear for another. State ex rel. Gaegler v. Thomas, 173 F. Supp.
568 (D. Md. 1959); Greenberg v. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (1958);
Frazee v. Western Dairy Prod. Co., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935), following
Lindley v. Knowlton f79 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918). One court recently expressed, in
dictum, the futility of attempting to distinguish between fear for oneself and fear for
another, but held in favor of the plaintiff because she herself was in danger. H.E. Butt
Grocery Co. v. Perez, 408 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). In a few older cases, it
appears that recovery may have been granted on the basis of the plaintiff's fear for
another person. However, these cases have generally been distinguished by later courts
faced with the zone of danger problem. Gulf, C. and S.F. Ry. v. Coopwood, 96 S.W. 102
(Tex. Civ. App. 1906) is distinguishable on the basis that a contractual duty was owed to
the plaintiff as a paying passenger of the defendant railroad. See Note, Damages-
Mental Anguish, 13 IND. L.J. 583 (1938). Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58
So. 927 (1912) appears to involve fear by the plaintiff for herself as well as for her
children. In any event, the issue of fear for a third party was not raised, and the opinion
was devoted to the impact rule. Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791,
148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914), involved a plaintiff who fainted from fright on seeing her child-
ren in danger and fell into an unguarded elevator shaft. This case has been considered
by the New York courts as a variation of the impact rule, with physical injury resulting
from fright caused by the negligent act. See Mundy v. Levy Bros. Realty Co., 184
App. Div. 467, 468, 170 N.Y.S. 994, 995 (1918). Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232,
280 N.W. 890 (1938), allowed recovery where the plaintiff apparently feared not only
for the effects of negligence on others, but also feared the loss of his dairy business,
through the sale of milk after using contaminated cattle feed sold by the defendant.
However, until Dillon no American court specifically abandoned the zone of danger
requirement in negligence cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965).
See generally on negligent infliction of emotional distress 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS 1031-39 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 346-54 (3d ed.
1964) ; Goodhart, The Shock Cases and Zone of Risk, 16 MOD. L. REv. 14 (1953).
When the tort has been intentionally inflicted upon a victim, recovery by a third
party frequently has been permitted. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 46, 312
(1965). The rationale for granting redress centers upon the culpability of the defendant's
act, and it has been stated that the jury is ordinarily in a better position to determine
whether outrageous conduct results in mental distress than whether the mental distress
in turn results in physical injury. From their own experience jurors are aware of
the extent and character of the disagreeable emotions that may result from the
defendant's conduct. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30
VA. L. REv. 193 (1944). See also Prosser, Insidt and Outrage 44 CALiF.
L. REv. 40 (1956). The result in such cases is not unlike the cases of physical
injury which rely upon the doctrine of transferred intent, which results in liability where
one person intends to harm physically another but harms a third party instead. One case
has allowed recovery on this theory for fright caused by a battery committed upon the
plaintiff's father. Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924). These cases
require that the plaintiff be present at the scene and that the presence be known to the
defendant. Taylor v. Vallelunga, 171 Cal. App. 2d 107, 339 P.2d 910 (1959). Koontz v.
Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E.2d 694 (1936). Likewise, most cases have limited
recovery to members of the immediate family. Contra, Hill v. Kimball, supra; and
Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920). The leading Indiana authority in
this area is Klein v. Klein, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9 (1902).
3. In negligence actions the emotional shock must result in some physical
manifestation of illness. All courts who have ruled upon the question of emotional
injuries have stressed that mere "hurt feelings" are not significant enough or sufficiently
measurable to be considered. In many jurisdictions neurotic reactions, accompanied by
severe headaches, dizziness, crying spells, irritability, back pains and similar mani-
festations, resulting from fright caused by negligence, are regarded as "physical injures."
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the result of harm to the plaintiff or of fear of such harm. The liberality
of the California court in abandoning this requirement that the plaintiff
have been within the "zone of danger" necessitated an overruling of
that court's own logically compelling recent holding in Amaya v. Home
Ice, Fuel and Supply Co.' and raises serious questions of the viability
of the general framework of fault principles in providing workable
solutions to questions of tort liability.
In Dillon, the plaintiff personally witnessed the death of her young
daughter when the child was struck by a negligently operated motor
vehicle. The mother alleged that, because of the driver's negligence, she
"sustained great emotional disturbance and shock and injury to her
nervous system which caused her great physical and mental pain and
suffering."' The trial court sustained the defendant's motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings since the complaint did not allege that the plaintiff
was in the zone of danger and feared for her own welfare. However, the
trial court overruled the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to
a separate cause of action, brought in behalf of the sister of the deceased,
for alleged shock with resultant physical and mental suffering. The
happenstance of her greater proximity to the point of impact6 gave rise
to the possibility that she was in the zone of danger and feared for her
own safety. In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court held that
since the negligent driver should have foreseen the presence of the mother
at the scene of the accident he owed a duty to her, the breach of which
See Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933) ; Sutton Motor Co. v. Crysel,
289 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). As early as 1933, definite nervous dis-
turbances or disorders caused by mental shock and excitement were classified as physical
injuries and would therefore support an action for damages for negligence where they
are the proximate result of negligence. Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114 Cal.
App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1933). Where infliction of emotional distress
is intentional no resulting bodily harm is necessary. See, e.g., Delta Finance
v. Ganakas 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 46 (1965). Such is the case even where the plaintiff is beyond the
zone of danger if he is a member of the victim's immediate family. See note 2 supra.
4. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 379
P.2d 513 (1963). Comment, 15 STAN. L. REV. 740 (1963). The plaintiff, seven months
pregnant, saw her seventeen month old son run over by the defendant's truck She
alleged that she was standing near her son and witnessed the defendant's negligently
operated truck approaching and shouted warnings, but the defendant failed to stop. She
alleged that as a "direct and proximate result of the defendant's conduct, she suffered
emotional shock which resulted in 'some permanent disability.'" The plaintiff refused
to allege that she feared for her own safety, but rather contended nervous shock was a
direct result of fear for her child.
5. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 731, 441 P.2d 912, 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 74 (1968).
See the discussion of the necessity of "physical" suffering at note 3 supra.
6. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the sister was on the curb or on
the street. However, the trial court considered the question one of fact determination
and denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 732, 441 P.2d at 915, 69
Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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subjected him to liability for her emotional injuries.
In the Antaya case, the court provided a comprehensive evaluation
-of the establishment of duty through foreseeability7 A review of decisions
in those jurisdictions which had examined the problem produced the
conclusion that to attempt to establish a duty flowing from a negligent
defendant to an emotionally injured third party witness by stating that
the defendant could foresee the injury to his victim is a futile task.
The determination that a duty is owed the plaintiff by the defendant
is, the court averred, "in the first instance for the court, not for the jury."
It is "the fundamental responsibility of the court to declare the law. There
is a legal duty on any given set of facts only if the court or the legislature
says there is a duty."' The court expressed strong approval of an
assertion by the New Jersey Supreme Court: ".... manifestly, it cannot
be conceded that the jury from their inner consciousness may evolve in
every variety of tortfeasance a legal duty as the standard of liability."9
The court reasoned further that duty is not to be equated with foresee-
ability and quoted Prosser to the effect that
[d] uty is only a word with which we state our conclusion that
there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily begs the essential
question (italics deleted) . . . . [The word] serves a useful
purpose in directing attention to the obligation to be imposed
upon the defendant rather than the causal sequence of events;
beyond that it serves none.'"
Duty is determined by numerous factors," only one of which is the
defendant's foreseeability, with its ultimate determination rooted in the
social policy to be served by imposing it.
The court also noted that to submit the issue of duty to the jury
after equating duty with foreseeability would engender confusion. The
7. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 306-10, 379 P.2d 513,
520-22, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40-42 (1963).
8. Id.
9. Morril v. Morril, 104 N.J.L. 557, 142 A. 337, 339, 340 (1928); qzwted in Amaya
v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 307-08, 379 P.2d 513, 520, 29 Cal. Rptr.
33,40 (1963).
10. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Micir. L. REv. 1, 15 (1953).
11. The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
liable to a third person . . . is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of
various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), quoted in Amaya v. Home, Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 309-10, 379 P.2d 513, 521-22, 29 Cal. Rtpr. 33,
41-42 (1963).
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negligence issue is submitted to the jury with instructions couched in
terms of how an ordinarily prudent person would view the "foreseeability
of risk" created by the defendant's conduct. If the issue of the existence
of duty to the particular party harmed is also submitted to the jury
under a foreseeability formula, the jury will in effect be asked to determine
two distinct issues in the case by means of the same test. The suspicion
arises that in this event a jury will become confused sufficiently to ignore
instructions and simply deliver a verdict according to their liking.
Both the Amaya and Dillon opinions recognize the conflicting policy
considerations of providing redress for a valid claim and eschewing
administrative complications. In Amaya the specter of fraudulent claims,
apparently an ever-present concern when a cause of action involves no
impact and revolves around damage to the nervous system; the much
debated difficulty of measuring damages ;12 the problem of setting limits
upon who may recover; and disproportion between the potentially sizeable
liability imposed and the culpability of the negligent defendant were
deemed preponderant. The consequences of granting redress were thought
too grave.
The Dillon opinion commenced its attack upon the illogic of the
zone of danger rule by centering on the facts at bar upon which the sister
of the deceased could base a cause of action for emotional trauma while
her mother, though just as severely harmed, could not. This factual
framework provided a perfect exposition of what the opinion alluded to
as the "hopeless artificiality" of the rule. In addition it was observed
that the concept of a "zone of danger" is premised upon the reasonable
fear of impact; thus the concept seems anachronistic in a jurisdiction
which abandoned the "impact" rule many years ago.1"
Although no American court had ruled that emotionally induced
physical injury, precipitated by a negligent act, was compensable if the
plaintiff was not present within the zone of danger, the court noted that
recovery upon such grounds was not totally without precedent. Ham-
12. See note 28 infra.
13. Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939). See Magruder,
Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 HAiv. L. Rav. 1032, 1039
(1936) :
Once accepting the view that a plaintiff threatened with an injurious impact
may recover for bodily harm resulting from shock without impact, it is easy to
agree . . . that to hinge recovery on the speculative issue [of] whether the
parent was shocked through fear for herself or for her children "would be
discreditable to any system of jurisprudence." The outer-most limits of liabiity
in [these cases] has not yet been marked out, and cannot be determined on
purely logical considerations.
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brook v. Stokes 4 initiated a line of authority in England allowing a
cause of action for harm arising from fear for another. In Hambrook, a
mother died from nervous shock as a result of viewing a runaway
vehicle rushing down a hill and fearing for the safety of her children whom
she believed to be in its path. Whether she was in the area of probable
physical harm was not considered relevant. The court reasoned that
the defendant, having failed to secure his vehicle, had breached a duty to
all users of the highway and consequently was responsible for any harm
directly flowing from that breach. The only limitation suggested by the
English court was that the mother's fear must have resulted from her own
perception of the likelihood of injury to her children, not from information
learned from others. The British court in Hambrook centered upon the
preeminence of "natural justice" over the illogic of the zone of danger
rule:
[The rule] would result in a state of the law in which the
mother shocked by fright for herself would recover, while a
mother shocked by her child being killed before her eyes could
not, and in which a mother traversing the highway with a child
in her arms would recover if shocked by fright for herself, while
if she could be cross-examined into the admission that the fright
was really for the child, she could not. [s]uch distinctions
would be discreditable to any system of jurisprudence in which
they formed a part. 5
The Dillon opinion while alluding to "natural justice," omits this language
from Hambrook. The position taken would have been more compelling
were it included. Rather, the court challenged the logic of the rule by
quoting from Professor Prosser:
All ordinary human feelings are in favor of (the mother's)
action against the negligent defendant. If a duty to her requires
that she herself be in some recognizable danger, then it has been
properly said that when a child has been endangered, it is not
beyond contemplation that the mother will be somewhere in the
vicinity and will suffer serious shock. 6
In Dillon the court set forth a conceptual rationale for abandoning
14. [1925] 1 K.B. 141. Some dissatisfaction with the result in Hambrook was
expressed in BourhUll v. Young, [1943] A.C. 92, but it was not overruled and is now
firmly established in British law. The development of English law in this area is
discussed in text at note 41 infra.
15. Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925J 1 K.B. 141, 157. See note 2 supra for discussion
of the extent to which these distinctions permeate American law.
16. W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS 353 (3d ed. 1964).
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the rule. Focusing upon duty as the sole alleged defect in an otherwise
sufficient complaint the court, again quoting Prosser, 7 noted that to
say there is no duty in such cases begs the essential question of whether
the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defend-
ant's conduct and that "duty" is a shorthand statement of a conclusion,
rather than an aid to analysis. The court thus remained in apparent
agreement with its prior assertions in Amaya that the concept is not
sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum of those con-
siderations of policy which leads the law to say that a particular plaintiff
is entitled to protection.
Ultimately, however, the court seems to have equated duty with
foreseeability: "It is the risk reasonably to be foreseen which defines the
duty that is owed." 8 According to the court, the extent of liability
is determined by the fact that "[i] n order to limit the otherwise potentially
infinite liability which would follow every negligent act, the law of torts
holds a defendant amenable only for injuries to others which to the
defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable."'8
It would seem that two types of risk may be foreseeable-risk of
actual physical impact and the risk that persons not physically imperiled
will be subject to mental anguish. The resultant suffering is nonetheless
real in the latter case and recovery should be granted if the defendant
should foresee that fright may result which would be sufficient to cause
substantial injury to one normally constituted. This result is much like
that obtaining in cases where the damage caused by the defendant is
extended to the plaintiff by the foreseeable acts of third persons,20 the
foreseeable intervention of forces of nature,"' or the plaintiff's own
17. Id. 332-33.
18. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79
(1968), quoting from the majority opinion of Justice Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
19. Dillion v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79(1968). The court also cites 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1018 (1956):
[Liability depends upon whether] the offending conduct foreseeably involved
unreasonably great risk of harm to the interest of someone other than the
actor .... [TIhe obligation to refrain from . . . particular conduct is owed
only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with
respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreason-
ably dangerous. Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of the risk
which negligence foreseeably entails.
20. E.g., Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 46, 234 P. 300 (1925). The
defendant's agents continued to throw free candy to a crowd from a parade float
although it caused a scramble among spectators. The plaintiff, a bystander, was knocked
down and hurt in one of the scrambles.
21. E.g., Milwaukee and St. P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876), A fire was
negligently started on the defendant's steamboat and was spread by a brisk wind to the
defendant's elevator on the shore, and from there to the plaintiff's saw mill several
hundred feet from the elevator.
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foreseeable response." In each instance there is a foreseeable reaction to
the defendant's act which extends the damage and liability to the plaintiff.
Thus, in the rescuer cases, the courts readily find duty, basing it upon the
natural reaction of the plaintiff to a third party's distress.2" Since it is
certainly as natural a consequence for a mother to suffer emotional
distress upon witnessing the killing of her child, it can be argued that it
is inconsistent to find a duty in one instance and not in the other.24 It
must be noted, however, that the usefulness of drawing logical analogies
is limited by the likelihood that policy considerations may vary with the
facts of each type of case.25
According to the court, what is reasonably foreseeable in third party
emotional danger cases must be adjudicated upon a case-by-case basis.
The standard to be employed to determine foreseeability will entail a
finding of what the reasonably prudent man should have perceived. The
courts may then be left to fashion the area of liability, excluding the
remote and unexpected. In Dillon the court reasoned that a negligent
driver who causes the death of a young child may reasonably foresee that
the mother might be near and might suffer emotional trauma upon
witnessing the accident. Thus, the court established the possible existence
of duty.
The court next proceeded to examine the policy considerations which
have compelled prior decisions. The court reasoned that to deny that
juries are capable of weeding the fraudulent from the meritorious claim
is to deny that courts are capable of performing their appointed tasks.
Moreover, the possibility of fraud exists to some degree in all cases, but
this possibility does not prove a present necessity to abandon the principles
of foreseeability, proximate cause and consequential injury which gener-
ally govern tort law. Conceding that tort law is not mathematically
precise, the difficulties of adjudication should, nevertheless, not frustrate
the principle that there must be a remedy for every substantial wrong.
Fraud could as easily exist where the plaintiff claims fear for himself, a
22. E.g., the rescuer cases, such as Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176,
133 N.E. 437 (1921). The plaintiff was injured while seeking to rescue a relative who
had been thrown negligently from a train. Cf. Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App.
Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914). The plaintiff fainted from fright on seeing her children
in danger and fell into an unguarded elevator shaft. The presence of the physical impact
sustained a cause of action.
23. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921):
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law
does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its conse-
quences. It regards them as normal. It places their effects within the range
of the natural and probable.
24. Cf. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1035-36 (1956).
25. See J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 179 (1957) for a rejection
of the analogy to the rescue cases.
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claim for which liability has long been allowed in California. Emotional
distress which is intentionally inflicted constitutes an independent tort
and the possibility of fraudulent collection for injuries in these instances
is as great as in the negligent infliction cases. Also, "suffering" is a
compensable item of damages when "parasitic to" a physical tort;26 but
"mental suffering" is clearly less capable of objective measurement than
the physical disabilities precipitated by the emotional injury sustained in
the case in question. Finally, given rapid increases in medical know-
ledge,2" and recognition of this fact by many courts,2" there is little
question that the court correctly concluded that emotional trauma cases
are proper for adjudication. However, since recovery had been denied in
Amaya and other cases in part because of the fear of unmeasurable claims,
the court might have set forth more authority to substantiate its con-
clusion.
The court contended that the difficulty of establishing guidelines
in the future cannot justify denial of a deserved remedy. Formulation
of guidelines was not deemed impossible, and in fact an attempt at
formulation was made. The court mentioned a non-exhaustive list of
considerations which can be balanced in determining what a tortfeasor
reasonably may foresee: physical proximity of the plaintiff to the scene
of the accident; whether shock results from direct sensory impact upon
the plaintiff from observance of the accident as contrasted with learning
of it after its occurrence; and the intimacy of the relationship between the
plaintiff and the victim. With these elements as a guide, a court will then
be free to analyze all circumstances in its determination. Conceding the
general nature of these guidelines, the court noted that general guide-
lines have been offered without disastrous results in analogous areas of
the law such as the open car, negligent draftsmanship and products
liability cases.29 It is the court's premise in Dillon that guidelines can
26. Sloane v. Southern Calif. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896).
27. E.g., Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 359, 124 N.W.2d 312, 317 (1963):
Psychiatry and clinical psychology, while not exact sciences can provide
sufficiently reliable information, relating to the extent of psychological stress
and to the causal relationship between the injury and the defendant's conduct,
to enable a trier of fact to make intelligent evaluative judgments on a
plaintiff's claim.
28. See, e.g., Strothman, Traninatic Neurosis, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 350 (1967);
Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis and the Law, 6 CLEv.-MAR.
L. REv. 428 (1957). Goodhart, The Shock Case and the Area of Risk, 16 MODERN L.
REv. 14 (1953). The leading authority contra is Smith, Relation of Emnotions to Injury
and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944), based on
a study of cases where courts had allowed recovery for emotional distress.
29, The prototype of the "open car" case is the suit against the owner of a
vehicle for injury or damage to the plaintiff by a third party who has commandeered the
vehicle as a consequence of the owner's carelessness in leaving the keys inside. Richardson
v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955). The general "guidelines', if the term is at
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successfully curtail what was termed in Amaya "the fantastic realm of
infinite liability."80
The dissenting justices in Dillon challenged the guidelines as overly
vague and general and declared that "upon analysis their seeming cer-
tainty evaporates into arbitrariness and inexplicable distinctions
appear." 1 Answers to some of the dissent's further objections, such as
the question arising if the plaintiff is honestly mistaken as to the existence
or seriousness of the victim's injury, can be found in the application of
ordinary tort principles. If the defendant in fact has been negligent toward
the victim, the plaintiff's reasonable misapprehension as to the extent
of injury should not bar his recovery. There is merit, however, in the
dissent's disparagement of the guidelines. The majority seemingly implied
in its requirement of a "close relationship" between the plaintiff and the
victim that the relationship be familial, thus providing little assistance
where the relationship is distant or informal, but very close on an
emotional level. This factor also fails to deal with a situation where the
defendant's act is such that a normal person might suffer severe shock
though unrelated in any way with the victim." Similarly the require-
ment of contemporaneous observance of the accident seems unduly con-
fining. As the dissenting judges noted:
Indeed, what is the magic in the plaintiff's being actually pres-
ent? Is the shock any less real if the mother does not know
of the accident until her injured child is brought into her home?
all applicable, can be said to provide only that each case must be considered on its facts
to determine if the defendant's conduct is so unreasonable as to constitute a foreseeable
risk to the injured plaintiff. Courts have held a negligent draftsman of a document
executed for the benefit of a third party beneficiary liable to the beneficiary. Lucas v.
Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). The cases eliminate
the requirement of privity between the draftsman and the foreseeably injured beneficiary.
It may be noted that these cases are exceptions to the general rule as to professional
representation as expounded by Judge Cardozo in Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co.,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). The products liability cases find their most
articulate expression in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The essence of this decision is that a manufacturer may
be held liable to the ultimate consumer absent any privity of contract. The "guidelins"
are that the defendant manufacturer is strictly liable in tort if he distributes a "defective
product, inherently dangerous."
30. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 315, 379 P.2d 513,
525, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 45 (1963).
31. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 749, 441 P.2d 912, 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 86
(1968) (dissenting opinion).
32. Cf. Chadwick v. British Transp. Conm'n, [1967] 2 All E.R. 945 (Q.B.).
The plaintiff was allowed recovery for emotional distress and physical illness resulting
from rescue work at a particularly gruesome train wreck, although acquainted with
no one on the train. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1039 (1956),
where it is suggested that recovery might be allowed in such cases applying general
principles of duty and negligence, and that "mechanical rules of thumb at variance with
these principles do more harm than good."
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On the other hand, is it any less real if the mother is physically
present at the scene but is nevertheless unaware of the danger
or injury to her child until after the accident has occurred ?
The dissenting judges also quite appropriately challenged the inter-
pretation given by the majority to the affirmative defense of contributory
negligence. The latter stated categorically that the contributory negligence
of the victim of the accident will defeat recovery by the plaintiff. This
position is clearly contrary to existing California law regarding imputa-
tion of contributory negligence-the relationship of itself furnishes no
basis for imputation of contributory negligence,"4 although the result
may be an unhappy extension of liability where the defendant is no more
culpable than the original victim.
Even if one accepts the court's estimate of the feasibility of guide-
lines, there remains the task of inquiring into the soundness of the
reasoning employed to justify this departure from established law. As an
initial point, it may be stated that the court has succumbed to the pitfall
of confusing policy ends with negligence principles. Under Dillion a
person has a right to be free from certain invasions of his emotional
security. In effect the opinion recognized that there exists a zone of emo-
tional danger wherein persons suffering harm may be entitled to redress
for their injury. Concurrently, it was recognized that the intimate nature
of the parent-child relationship is such that there exists a common or
commingled fear wherein fear for one's child is scarcely distinguishable
from fear for oneself. Thus, a parent who witnesses his child harmed suf-
fers a common fear sufficient to place him within the zone of emotional
danger. To this point the opinion is on firm ground.3 5 However, the
court's rationale in establishing duty through the concept of foreseeabiltiy
is less creditable.
So long as future courts are directed by the principle of foreseeability
and are limited by the guidelines advanced, the goal of "natural justice"
33. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 750, 441 P.2d 912, 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 86
(1968) (dissenting opinion). See also the dissenting opinion of Evatt, J., in Chester v.
Waverly Corp., 62 Conmw. L.R. 1 (High Ct. Austl. 1939), who extensively discusses
these questions while objecting to the majority's holding that a mother could not recover
for shock suffered on seeing her son's body recovered from a waterfilled ditch after a
harrowing search.
34. The dissenters cited B. WIrxTIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 341 (1960)
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 488 (1965) for this proposition. Where
the plaintiff's spouse is one of the negligent parties, recovery may be barred, not on the
basis of the relationship, but because the right to damages is community property.
McFadden v. Santa Ana, 0. & T. St. Ry., 87 Cal. 464, 25 P. 681 (1891); Basler v.
Sacramento Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 514, 111 P. 530 (1910).
35. The law has recognized other special relationships as deserving of protection.
For example, the law of consortium is a recognition that destruction of marital entitle-
ments is subject to special redress. See Annot., 23 A.L.R. 2d 1378-97 (1952).
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for which the court strived may in many instances not be realized. The
central problem was recognized in Amaya:
[C]ompelling moral and socio-economic reasons . . . require
that a negligent defendant's liability have some stopping point.
None has yet been proposed that would be fair to all concerned,
and the failings of (proposed) limitations suggests that the quest
may be an inherently fruitless one."0
This criticism emphasizes the peril of attempting to formulate a
rule of law within the context of negligence principles when the con-
ventional system will not absorb the shift smoothly. This difficulty
could have been circumvented. When "social justice" is the desired goal,
social policy should be the principle by which it is attained. Conceding
that the need for redress to the plaintiff transcends the increased liability
which the defendant must assume, the Dillon decision should have been
premised on the proposition that the cogent necessities of providing
recompense to an injured party dictate that a negligent defendant owes a
duty to an emotionally traumatized plaintiff as a matter of social policy.
There is ample reasoning to support this position,3" and it is much in
harmony with the conclusion reached in both Dillon and Amaya that
duty is only an expression of the sum of those considerations of policy
which result in granting some interest protection.
Once negligence has been established with respect to the party
physically imperiled no further attention should be focused on what the
tortfeasor might have foreseen had he given conscious thought to his
conduct immediately prior to the accident. If the concept of foreseeability
is to have any relevance, the presence at the scene of impact of an indivi-
dual bearing a particular relationship to the injured party should be
accepted as given and the determination of foreseeability of injury to the
former should commence from that point. The jury could be instructed
that as a matter of law a duty was owed every person present at the
scene of the tragedy who might reasonably be expected to suffer trauma.
Here, factors such as personal relationship and physical proximity can
36. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 313, 379 P.2d 513,
524,29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44 (1963).
37. The case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 379 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), is particularly in point. Faced with the problem of
circumventing the many-faceted problem of privity of contract which had perplexed
courts since the decision of Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 631 (1842), the
California Supreme Court cut through the maze and rested its decision on "strict
liability in tort." A reading of Greenman clearly demonstrates that the California court
based its conclusion on the social policy factors which dictated that redress to the
plaintiff consumer transcend the necessity of maintaining the legal abstraction of privity
of contract.
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have application while the somewhat senseless inquiry as to the probability
that a parent or an acquaintance will or will not be present or that persons
will be within close or distant proximity will be avoided.
Mere physical causation should not result in recovery in cases of
undue sensitivity; it should be emphasized that emotional distress must
be a reasonable response. The suggested procedure would eliminate the
plaintiff with the eggshell soul, and would present to the collective
judgment of the jury the propriety of any award. The jury would be
allowed to weigh medical testimony and all other factors surrounding the
event to determine how a reasonable plaintiff would have reacted in
similar circumstances. This question is distinct from that of the measure-
ment of physical damages flowing from the emotional distress once
liability is found. At that point the maxim that the defendant takes his
victim as he finds him would rule. Here the question parallels that which
is the only relevant inquiry in the classic case of the hemophiliac-has a
negligent act in fact occurred as to this plaintiff ?
According to the dissenting opinion, a decision of such far reaching
consequences should be undertaken by a legislative body rather than by
the courts: "[If we] are now to be faced with the concept of potentially
infinite liability beyond any rational relationship to . . .culpability, then
surely the point has been reached at which the legislature should reconsider
the entire subject and allow all interests affected to be heard."3 8 It seems
clear, however, that legislative inaction has not prevented courts from
promulgating rules equally as revolutionary as that rendered by the Dillon
court. It is not at all clear that the "potentially infinite liability" envisioned
by the dissenting judges will result from the Dillon court's decision. The
experience of the English courts since Hambrook v. Stokes3 9 is especially
instructive. Ham brook, unlike Dillon, did not propose guidelines for
future cases but suggested only the limitation that the mother must have
herself perceived the likelihood of injury to her children. In later cases,
the English courts have relied solely on the test of foreseeability in
determining whether a duty exists toward the plaintiff." Despite this lack
of supposed guidelines, liability has not been greatly expanded. In fact
until a recent decision,4 the English courts have been quite restrictive
38, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 752, 441 P.2d 912, 928, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 88
(1968) (dissenting opinion).
39. [1925] 1 K.B. 141.
40. See, e.g., Bourhill v. Young, [1943] A.C. 92, 104 (Lord MacMillan):
The duty to take care is the duty to avoid doing or omitting to do anything
the doing or omitting to do which may have as its reasonable and probable
consequence injury to others, and the duty is owed to those to whom injury
may reasonably and probably be anticipated if the duty is not observed.
41. Boardman v. Sanderson, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1317 (C.A.). The plaintiff was
paying a bill in a service garage when he heard the scream of his young son, who had
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in finding liability to third parties."2 The most liberal extension of
liability allowed recovery to a plaintiff who had not seen the negligent
act and was not acquainted with any of the victims." However, the case
involved a rescue worker at a catastrophic train wreck and there was
considerable testimony as to the particularly gruesome experiences under-
gone by the plaintiff.
Also, at least one jurisdiction, New South Wales, Australia, has
passed legislation allowing recovery for mental shock suffered by members
of the injured party's family.4" Fleming, commenting upon such legisla-
tion, says, "Drastic as this measure may seem, the absence of any serious
increase in litigation should give pause to those who have been wont to
predict the direct results accompanying any easing of the common law
conditions of recovery."4
In final analysis it may be that the likelihood of "potential limitless
liability" is somewhat less than is thought in some quarters. Fleming's
study of cases in the emotional trauma area demonstrates what he
chooses to call "the confirmed judicial bias against claims for other than
external injuries." ' Perhaps juries share this same reluctance. Thus,
Dillon notwithstanding, it is possible that ". . . the law will long remain
committed to some marked disparity in the range of protection afforded
for mental suffering in contrast to external injuries."" Perhaps the
floodgates have not been opened after all. Only future decisions will
provide the answer. All that is now certain is that the California experience
will be closely scrutinized by those judges of other appellate courts who
may ultimately be called upon to emulate what appears to be a broad scale
accompanied him to the garage. He stepped out of the office and saw his son's foot
caught under the wheel of the defendant's car. The court found a duty to near relatives
of the victim whom the defendant knew to be within earshot and likely to come upon
the scene if injury befell him.
42. See, e.g., King v. Phillips, [1953] 1 Q.B. 429 (C.A.). The plaintiff heard a
scream and ran to her window where she saw a taxi, about eighty yards away, slowly
backing over her son's tricycle, although she did not see her son. She ran quickly
downstairs and met her son who was running home only slightly harmed. She suffered
shock and required doctor's care. The court refused to find it foreseeable that the slow
backing of a taxi would cause someone emotional distress.
43. Chadwick v. British Transp. Comm'n, [1967] 2 All E.R. 945 (Q.B.).
44. New South Wales Law Reform (Misc. Provisions) Act of 1944 § 4(1),
6 NEw SOUTH WALES STAT. (1824-1957) 191 (1960):
The liability of any person in respect of injury caused . ..by an act, neglect
or default by which any other person is killed, injured or put in peril, shall
extend to include liability for injury arising wholly or in part from mental or
nervous shock sustained by (a) a parent or husband or wife of the person so
killed, injured or put in peril; or (b) any other member of the family of the
person so killed, injured or put in peril within the sight or hearing of the
member of the family.
45. J. FLEmNG, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 164 (1957) (emphasis added).
46. Id. 163.
47. J. FLEmING, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 54 (1967).
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effort by their liberal brethren to abolish arbitrary restrictions on the
time-honored test of foreseeability4
John David Craig
48. Such a trend seems evident in view of the recent decisions of the California
Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian, 68 Cal.2d 700, 443 P.2d 561, 69 Cal. Rptr.
708 (1968); and Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan -Cal.2d-, -P.2d-,
73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969). In the former the court held that a possessor of land would
be liable for injuries incurred by a party while on the premises if the possessor had not
acted reasonably in view of the probability of injury to others regardless of whether
the victim would have been considered an invitee, licensee or trespasser under the rules
which had previously bound the courts. In the latter the court held that a lender
could be liable to the purchaser of a defectively constructed residence where th'e
borrower's weak capital structure made it foreseeable that he would cut corners in
constructing the residence. The policy of deterring undesirable practices was explicitly
held to prevail over the doctrine of privity.
